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Stream, River, Delta:
Induced Innovation and Environmental Values in Economics and Policy
C. Ford Runge
I.  Introduction
I was a student at New College, Oxford, when I read the first edition of Hayami and
Ruttan’s Economic Development: An International Perspective (1971).  Queen Elizabeth House,
where I attended weekly seminars, was much more affected by Cambridge radicals, such as
Maurice Dobb, than it was neoclassical theory, which held more sway at places like Nuffield 
College.  However, A. K. Sen’s doctoral work, The Choice of Technique and Frances Stewart’s
Technology and Underdevelopment offered critical foundations to evaluate the important issues
raised by the Hayami-Ruttan collaboration.  When I returned to Wisconsin to finish my own
dissertation, I was especially struck by the power of induced institutional innovation, and the
dialectic of institutional and technological change as a way of thinking about economic processes. 
I was complimented when Hayami and Ruttan adopted a definition of institutions drawn from my
dissertation in their 1985 edition,  and very pleased when offered a position at Minnesota with
Ruttan as a colleague.  In the more than 15 years since, my own work has continued to refract
and reflect that of Vernon Ruttan.
My purpose today is to trace a longer intellectual lineage, focused on Ruttan’s
contribution to an idea.  That idea is the role of induced innovation theory in establishing that the
environment (by which I mean natural ecosystems) has value, and that this value drives economicBibliographic searches suggest that this was one of the first, if not the first, time that
1
these two words appeared together in the title of an article or monograph.
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choices.  More specifically, I propose to trace the idea of induced technological choice  originated
by Hicks, and developed by Hayami and Binswanger, to a culminating set of observations which
appeared in Ruttan’s Presidential Address to the American Agricultural Economics Association in
1971, entitled “Technology and the Environment.”   I propose to show how the ideas in that
1
paper connected environmental values to institutional changes, including U.S. and European
regulatory policy in the 1970s and 1980s.  By the 1990s, the scope of this discussion expanded to
include the environment not only in domestic economic policy, but in international trade as well. 
The current debates over trade and environment, and the impact of income growth and
technology change on pollution (the so-called “Kuznet’s curve”) have their roots in the
observations on induced technological and institutional change offered in Ruttan’s 1971 address.
I will divide this analysis into three parts.  First, I will briefly discuss the stream of ideas
surrounding Hick’s concept of induced innovation, and its widening at the hands of Hayami and
Ruttan and others to a more general theory of technological and institutional change.  Second, I
will discuss the pivotal environmental concepts advanced in Ruttan’s 1971 Presidential Address at
a point when this stream was becoming a river.  Third, I will offer an interpretation of these
concepts’ influence on a theory of induced environmental change, and their underlying influence in
the current debate over trade and the environment.  What was a stream became, at Ruttan’s
hands, a widening river, and is now a fertile intellectual delta.
I.  Stream:  Induced Innovation Theory
The central insight offered by John Hicks (1932) in The Theory of Wages was that3
technological choice is induced by the relative abundance of factors of production.  This
hypothesis was first advanced by Hicks (1932) and subsequently elaborated by Fellner (1961,
1962), Kennedy (1964), Ahmad (1966), and Samuelson (1965).  In agriculture, it has been most
fully developed and tested by Hayami and Ruttan (1971, 1985) and Binswanger and Ruttan
(1978).  Constraints on economic growth imposed by relative factor scarcity have been overcome
by technical changes that substitute relatively abundant factor inputs for relatively scarce ones.
Early criticisms concerned the lack of a microeconomic mechanism triggering this
sequence (see Hayami and Ruttan 1985, 73-114).  In response, Binswanger developed an induced
innovation model in which research and development, stimulated by increases in product demand,
shifts the “innovation possibilities frontier” (Binswanger and Ruttan, 1978).  The choice of a
specific technique is then guided by relative factor scarcity.  This conception was developed as a
theory of firm behavior, but its application to the environment required generalization to a broader
set of public and private choices, in which inputs and outputs are broadly conceived.  Hayami and
Ruttan, using the notion of a “metaproduction function” (well before meta-analysis had gained
currency), argued that historic paths of Japanese and U.S. agricultural innovation could be
explained by the relative scarcity of land and abundance of labor in Japan, and the converse
scarcity of labor and abundance of land in the U.S.  It was this generalization that allowed the
extension beyond simple firm behavior to include a set of social choices.
This realization led to the complementary concept of “induced institutional innovation.” 
Institutions “are the rules of society or of organizations that facilitate coordination among people
by helping them form expectations which each person can reasonably hold in dealing with others”
(Hayami and Ruttan, 1985, p. 94).  The demand for this coordination arises from the need for4
assured benefits streams, now and in the future, in the form of rules of exclusion and inclusion
which institutions supply (Runge, 1984a, 1984b).  This may mean developing new property rights
in connection with factors of production including land, water, and energy, or new institutions to
guide the allocation of funds, as in agricultural research.  While some institutional innovations
occur only in the private sector (such as the application to scientific principles to mass production,
or “Fordism”), many involve collective action by other nonmarket institutions in which substantial
political costs are incurred to enact new taxes, subsidies, or other rules and regulations.
Hayami and Ruttan’s theory was attacked as excessively neoclassical by those who
claimed that it depended on market signals, e.g., factor prices.  Koppel (1995, p. 58 for example,
argued that “the robustness of the inducement metaphor is seriously stressed by social and
political contexts that simply do not correspond to the market (and ceteris paribus) assumptions
the metaphor carries.”  More fundamentally, Daniel W. Bromley argued that whatever streams of
value pertain to induced choices are themselves the result of logically and/or historically prior
entitlements defined by property rights and the institutional “set-up” within which choices occur
(Bromley, 1989, p. 23).
With respect to market price signals, I believe that Hicks, and especially Samuelson (1965)
more readily interpreted “prices” as shadow (rather than a market) prices resulting from
constraints imposed by the relative scarcity of factors of production.  Only in a first-best world
would this shadow value equal the market price.  Yet the explanatory power of the theory, as
theory,  loses no generality if the constraint imposed by physical scarcity is incompletely captured
in prices.  This observation is critical in considering environmental scarcity, in which markets
often fail.5
Bromley’s objection was that induced innovation theory, especially respecting institutions,
is driven by what it seeks to explain, and is in this sense under-identified if not tautological.  The
logical implication is either that institutions (and technology) should always be treated as given (a
view which I do not believe Bromley supports) or that everything is endogenous and mutually
causative: there really are not any independent variables.
I think there is another approach,  reminiscent of debates over capital as a “putty-clay”
(Phelps, 1963), in which some (perhaps a great deal) of technology and institutions are “given” to
a particular group by the previous period; but in which at least some choices of technique, and/or
institutions, are more flexible.  The determinism associated with the prior set-up defines how
much of the choice of current generations is “clay,” and how much is received as malleable
“putty.”  The putty/clay ratio thus determines the scope of both the technical and institutional
opportunity set, or innovation possibilities frontier.  The more restricted is this opportunity set,
the more “path dependency” is likely to be observed (see David, 1985).  Another implication is
that the putty/clay ratio, in both technical and institutional choices, will define the capacity of
individuals and groups to adapt to changes in their physical, social or intellectual environment,
based on the degree to which they are “set in their ways.”  I will explore both of these issues in
the context of environmental technology and policy below.
In summary, the induced innovation hypothesis is often criticized for depending too much
on market prices and not enough on the nonmarket institutions affecting economic change. Yet
relative factor scarcities (not prices) are the fundamental basis of the theory. Market prices may
not reflect this scarcity due to externalities or other market failures.  Yet market failures
themselves can induce institutional innovations which allow relative scarcities to be betterAs Ruttan and Hayami wrote in a 1995 retrospective: “In spite of missing markets, the
2
rising demand for environmental amenities has induced a response in the political marketplace”
(Ruttan and Hayami, 1995, p. 183).
6
reflected.  We turn now to the idea that certain ecological issues define increasing scarcity of
environmental goods — and the social response that has and continues to result.
II.  River: Induced Environmental Change
In 1971, the same year in which Agricultural Development was published, Ruttan
delivered his Presidential Address, “Technology and the Environment,” to the American
Agricultural Economics Association (AAEA).  Ruttan’s 1971 address, given only a year after the
first declaration of Earth Day, came at a time of great ferment and attention to environmental
policy innovation.  It had been less than a decade since Lynton Caldwell, of Indiana University,
had proposed environment as a new focus for public policy (Caldwell, 1963).  Led by Senators
Edmund Muskie of Maine, Henry Jackson of Washington, and acknowledged and signed by
President Nixon, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) was passed in 1970.  Nixon
declared the 1970s the “decade of the environment” and sent Congress a blueprint that created the
Environmental Protection Agency in December of 1970 (Andrews, 1999, p. 229).  While the
political pendulum has swung several times since, environmental protection is without question
now a consensus part of the OECD countries’ idea of what governments can and should do (see
Andrews, 1999).
Ruttan’s address recognized explicitly that induced innovation did not require fully
functioning markets, and that changes in individual and social choice could be induced precisely
by the fact that such markets were perceived to be missing.   It did lay great emphasis, however,
27
on another economic explanation for this process: the role of income growth.  In effect, Ruttan
argued that only in countries where some threshold of affluence had been achieved would
sufficient value be attached to environmental amenities to trigger social, including regulatory,
responses.  The exact level of this threshold would become a central point in later debates over
the “Kuznets’ curve.”  A corollary claim was that income growth had the opposite effect on the
relative value conferred on commodities, especially agricultural goods.  Hence, income growth
should simultaneously raise the value of environmental services while lowering the value of
agricultural goods.
The power of this argument was derived in part from its simplicity.  The second part is
really a social projection to all commodities of Engels’ law: the income expansion path for food
plotted against other goods is such that total expenditures for food fall relative to these other
goods with increases in income.  The first part, dubbed Ruttan’s Principle (Runge, 1987, p. 254),
was that the income expansion path for environmental amenities plotted against other goods is
such that total expenditures for these amenities rise relative to other goods with increases in
income.
Two important implications follow from this argument (Runge, 1987).  First, Engels’ Law
(demand for food falls, relative to other goods, with higher incomes), implies that as incomes rise
food producers may have a smaller claim on social rents than producers of other goods and
services.  In contrast, Ruttan’s Principle (demand for environmental quality rises strongly at
higher incomes) implies that income growth will lead societal resources to be shifted toward the
supply of environmental quality and technologies which promote it (see Dunlap, 1975).  This is
reinforced if environmental quality reductions are perceived as irreversible (Smith, 1975).  IfEmpirical support for the superiority of environmental quality as a consumption good is
3
provided in Buttel and Finn (1974) and McEvoy (1972).  However, these findings vary from
study to study, and have been shown to be sensitive to the specification of the particular empirical
test.  The most successful predictor of environmental concern reported in a review of findings is
education, which is highly correlated with income (Van Liere and Dunlap, 1980).
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income effects work in this way, they should apply both across countries and within them.  In the
United States, higher income groups should demand more environmental quality characteristics
then lower income groups.
Hirsch (1976) argued in a similar vein that “positional goods,” including environmental
quality, are scarce in some absolute or socially perceived sense and subject to congestion or
crowding through more extensive use.  If positional goods remain in fixed supply as other goods
become more plentiful, their price will rise, in the same way suggested by Smith (1975) and
Krutilla and Fisher (1975).  The tendency for positional goods to increase in price, Hirsch (p. 28)
observes, “will be reinforced if rising incomes increase the demand for them faster than for
material goods.”  This is to be expected because the use of them involves not only effort, but
time, a complementary superior good, because primary material needs including food have already
been satisfied at some threshold.  The combined effect of these influences “is that goods and
services sharing some or all of the characteristics of positional goods attract an increasing
proportion of family expenditure as family income rises.”
3
The interplay of Ruttan’s Principle and Engels’ Law helps explain trends in the
environmental regulation of agriculture.  Ruttan’s Principle predicts that if equilibrium between
willingness to pay and the implicit value of environmental quality is not achieved by markets,
higher income groups and countries will have greater reason than poor ones to correct this
disequilibrium through environmental regulation.  This suggests, first, that debates over9
environmental quality characteristics, and remedies for missing markets, will be most intense in
high-income circles.  Second, these debates can be expected to revolve around what--not whether
-- something should be done to protect environmental quality.  Some may favor market or quasi-
market solutions while others prefer regulation, but environmental quality will increasingly be a
consensus objective.  Correspondingly, international debate over environmental quality will occur
primarily between high-income countries such as Canada, the EU, and the United States.  Low-
income countries will show less interest in the environment than in expanded food output.
In summary, as incomes rise, Engels’ Law and Ruttan’s Principle predict growing
weakness of demand for agricultural products in comparison to environmental quality.  The case
on efficiency grounds for intervention to correct for missing markets in agriculture will therefore
weaken as the case for intervention to correct for missing markets in environmental quality is
strengthened (see Myers, 1986).  In wealthy countries and among high-income groups, the
dominance of distributive claims over efficiency may mean that transfers continue to the
agricultural sector, but these transfers will be reduced for those agricultural producers who harm
the environment.  New directions for agricultural research and technology will increasingly reflect
the higher value given to environmental quality characteristics (see English, et al., 1984).  In
agriculture, examples of changing technological possibilities partially induced by changing
institutional constraints include no-till or minimum-till cultivation practices, integrated pest
management, and a steadily growing number of more environmentally benign herbicides and
pesticides.
In a 1987 article, I attempted to operationalize these interactions in the context of U.S.
groundwater regulation.  Consider a three-stage model of technological choice in agriculture. Once such irrigation choices are made and capital is committed to them, they persist until
4
new relative factor prices are clearly established.  These concerns led Frederick (1980), among
others, to argue in favor of careful attempts to evaluate changing water and land scarcities. 
However, even perfect foresight with respect to quantitative scarcity would be insufficient if
qualitative considerations enter individual utility functions.
10
The first two stages involve:  the choice of technology and  the impact of this choice on the
quality of factors, such as groundwater.  The third stage occurs as changing water quality induces
institutional changes which in turn feed back to affect the choice of agricultural technology.  Let
there be two types of activity.  The first is agricultural production using land, water, and energy to
produce food; the second is consumption.  There are two types of agents: farmers and consumers. 
Some agents (farmers) are both producers and consumers.  Consumers demand food produced by
farmers.  They also consider the quality of land and water a direct superior consumption good. 
Farmers and consumers may both consider water quality as a consumption good, but farmers also
consider it a factor of production.  Producer-consumer externalities result from this
interdependence.
In the first stage, relative factor scarcity determines technical choices for producers.  In
the terms considered above, the relative scarcity of land, water, and energy explain research into
technologies such as center-pivot irrigation.  In the Central Sand Counties of Wisconsin, for
example, low water-holding capacity of the soil, high commodities prices, and abundant
underground water encouraged research during the 1950s and 1960s into the application and
adoption of center-pivots.  In 1974 irrigated acreage in these countries was 10 times what it was
in 1945, while from 1974 to 1977 alone irrigated acreage grew by 60 percent (Sloggett, 1979).
4
A second stage effect of the center-pivot was on water quality for nonagricultural
purposes.  In the case of Wisconsin, the coarse-grained sandy soils of the Central Sand CountiesLancaster (1966) first treated the characteristics of goods such as water as a bundle of the
5
form:
Z  = (z , z , . . . , z, . . . , z ) [1]      w1 2 j n
where Z  is a vector of consumption (and/or production) characteristics defining water resources w
and (z , . . . , z, . . . , z ) are particular characteristics such as salinity, rate of flow, and nitrate 1jn
levels.  Let W represent water as before, and Z  its vector of time referenced quality w
characteristics in a given area such as the Central Sands or High Plains.  If nitrate levels (j) vary
from place to place, such differences will be revealed only if a market for water or some (weakly)
complementary good, such as property in land, exists (see Freeman, 1979; Maler, 1974).
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hold less than once inch of water per foot and are quite permeable in areas where groundwater is
near the surface.  While the quantitative abundance of water encouraged irrigated crop
production, the soil characteristics contributed to leaching of nitrate into groundwater sources
(Griffin and Bromely, 1981).  This leaching contaminated some local water supplies, reducing
water quality despite the fact that water quantity was unaffected.  Although the example is
specific, the phenomenon is general: technical choices in agriculture affect the quality of the
physical environment.  As Saliba (1985) observes, quality and quantity of groundwater are not
separable.  This makes appraisal of specific water quality characteristics crucial to evaluating
alternative agricultural production techniques.
5
Assume that each consumer derives utility from consumption of water quality
characteristics, the characteristics of some composite commodity, and a flow of other
characteristics from a property parcel, such as distance from metropolitan areas or soils.  Let ZD
be a vector of distance characteristics, Z  be a vector of soil characteristics, and Z  be the level of sw
water quality, including characteristic z, nitrate levels.  Consumers’ demand price (willingness to j
pay) for water quality is then a function of Z , income M, and other variables affecting tastes and w
preferences, including Z  and Z , where the demand function is weakly separable in the property Ds
market (Freeman, 1979, 124-5).  The equilibrium condition equating the implicit marginal value ofThe conditions for estimating this willingness to pay function are quite strict (see
6
Freeman, 1979; Harrison and Rubenfeld, 1978).
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water quality to marginal willingness to pay for characteristic j (nitrate levels) gives willingness to
pay (WTP) for this characteristic on property parcel i as 
WTP  = ￿ R/￿ z = F(Z   Z   Z   M) [2]   ij j w D S
where Rj is the equilibrium rent attached to parcel i in the property market.  If technological
choice in agriculture creates environmental quality effects, and these effects have implicit value for
consumers of water, then they can be estimated in principle according to the above model.  
6
However, the problem solved by producers may involve different characteristics than that solved
by consumers.  Unless the market can fully mediate these claims, an external effect may arise,
leading to a search for nonmarket regulation alternatives.
Now consider a third stage in the induced innovation sequence.  The impact of agricultural
technology on environmental quality, if consumers demand different quality levels than producers,
may eventually affect the technology chosen by agricultural producers themselves.  This recursive
effect, leading from consumers’ demand for water quality back to producers’ choice of technique,
can be market driven if consumers’ environmental quality demands are reflected in market prices. 
In a large class of cases, however, the market mechanism fails.  Such “missing markets” create an
incentive to develop a nonmarket signaling mechanism, such as environmental regulations.
The reasons for these missing markets in cases of water quality are potentially many (see
Saliba, 1985).  Even if the quantitative scarcity of water is accurately signaled to agricultural
producers, leading to the adoption of efficient irrigation technologies, there is no guarantee that
the qualitative impacts of this choice will be accurately signaled either to farmers or consumers. 13
Because qualitative effects are often difficult to perceive and measure, an important reason
markets may be missing is imperfect information (see Dahlman, 1979; Graham-Tomasi, et al.,
1986; Runge and Myers, 1985).  Especially in the case of groundwater resources, this information
may be difficult to acquire due to spatial and temporal uncertainities about rates of flow,
underground recharge, and other hydrological issues.
With missing markets, there is an incentive to develop institutions capable of changing
farmers’ behavior in ways unachievable via market signals alone.  This arises because consumers’
marginal willingness to pay for water quality is greater than what is reflected in market values. 
Government subsidies, taxes, or regulations on property may be necessary in order to achieve
equilibrium between willingness to pay and the marginal implicit value of water quality to society
as a whole.
The development of these institutions is not costless.  As Buchanan and Stubblebine
(1962) originally emphasized, costs may exceed benefits, and the missing market may be “Pareto-
irrelevant.”  However, its irrelevance on grounds of Pareto-efficiency does not remove the
possibility of change due to distributive concerns (Runge and von Witzke, 1987).  If farmers are
perceived to gain through irrigation at the expense of consumers’ health, and this is viewed as
inequitable, then even if the costs of regulating water quality exceed its benefits on efficiency
grounds, collective action may still lead consumers to regulate the future technological choices of
farmers.  Issues of fairness and distribution augment the efficiency value attached by consumers to
water quality, acting as an additional motivation to develop mechanisms signaling these valuations
(see Nunn, 1985).
Consider the following sequence.  Extensive irrigation leads to nitrate pollution ofThe primary health effects associated with nitrate pollution are methemoglobinemia (Blue
7
baby syndrom) and gastric cancer (see Griffin and Bromley, 1981).
In the case of irrigation, recent evidence confirms declining use, although the exact causes
8
require further investigation.  According to a recent USDA study by Sloggett (reported in Agweek
1986, 58): “Higher costs are making farmers take a closer look at conservation, including ways of
recovering irrigation runoff and use of low-pressure center-pivot irrigation systems.”
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groundwater.  Despite continued abundance of water as an agricultural input, declining water
quality affects some consumers’ health.   If consumers value water quality highly, and are willing
7
to pay for it at levels in excess of those reflected in market values, this disequilibrium creates
incentives for institutional innovation in the form of taxes, subsidies, or regulations that constrain
groundwater or fertilizer use by agricultural producers, in effect raising the relative factor price of
water in production.  If enacted, these measures reduce farmers’ incentives to continue water-
intensive irrigation methods.  New research is stimulated into less water-intensive irrigation
techniques, inducing a new round of water-conserving technological innovations, such as drip-
irrigation.  In Figure 1, the effect is equivalent to a shift from DD, reflecting relative factor
abundance for water, to a new one such as ZZ.  Figure 1 shows how a new round of research
responding to the new regulatory or tax-subsidy constraints then induces innovation possibilities
such as IPC  , and new techniques such as I . 22  
This third stage in the process of induced innovation can be triggered even if markets for
environmental quality characteristics are missing.  It can profoundly affect subsequent choices of
agricultural technique.  Regulations impose costs on producers, altering implicit factor valuation
and inducing subsequent changes in agricultural technology.   The range of possible institutional
81516
 innovations is large, and need not include government regulation.  The relative costs and
perceived equity of various institutional alternatives affecting water quality may lead to
arrangements such as local water users associations or quasi-market options that are more
attractive than direct regulation (Anderson, et al., 1983) Thus, changes in the relative scarcity of
factors and changes in environmental quality cause both technology and institutions to evolve
together.
Looking backward, Ruttan’s arguments anticipated not only the shifting balance in the
demand for environmental amenities versus traditional agricultural commodities in high income
countries.  They also predicted the tensions over trade and the environment that would define
future fault lines between North and South.
[I]n relatively high-income economies the income elasticity of demand for
commodities and services related to sustenance is low and declines as income
continues to rise, while the income elasticity of demand for more effective
disposal of residuals and for environmental amenities is high and continues to
rise.  This is in sharp contrast to the situation in poor countries where the income
elasticity of demand is high for sustenance and low for environmental amenities
(Ruttan, 1971, pp. 707-708).
The simple power of the arguments in the 1971 address have, of course, been questioned.  Some
have questioned the idea that environmental amenities’ value rises with income.  It may also be
that the comparative value of agricultural commodities, or at least the capacity of their producers
to extract social rents, remains high even at high incomes in countries with strong rural traditions
and a collective memory of food insecurity, as in much of Europe or Japan.  Finally, and most
recently, the idea that income growth, especially growth due to increased trade openness, leads to
demands for environmental protection, has become central to the debates over trade and the17
environment, to which we now turn.
III.  Delta: Trade and the Environment
The idea that income expansion leads to reductions in environmental disamenities is most
famously captured in the “Kuznets Curve” (Kuznets, 1955), in which a pollutant such as SO  is 2
shown to follow a quadratic or cubic path in relation to increases in income.  Grossman and
Kreuger (1992) in a well-known Princeton University working paper, suggested that data from
the World Health Organization (WHO) of environmental pollutants in 44 cites across the world
showed such a relationship, with the downward slope in pollution beginning at about $5,000 in
constant income (see also Grossman and Kreuger, 1995).  Unfortunately, some advocates of trade
liberalization used this finding to advocate trade reform by asserting a kind of automaticity to the
pollution reductions.  Grossman and Kreuger made no such claim, instead suggesting that the
impacts of income growth on pollution be decomposed into the impacts on the scale of economic
(and polluting) activity, the techniques of production (more or less pollution intensive) and the
composition of output (dirtier or cleaner).  These arguments were formalized and further
advanced by Copeland and Taylor (1994, 1995), Selden and Song (1994) and Hauer (1997),
among others.
Even so, we still do not understand the essential mechanisms by which trade expansion
and income growth lead to reductions in pollution, or whether such reductions even occur in most
cases.  While recent evidence continues to support the fact that changes in production techniques
leading to clearer technologies are capable of overcoming increasing pollution intensity arising
from the scale of production, it is evident that these techniques result in large part due to social
choices in which regulatory constraints change the costs of producing in more 18Antweiler, et al. (1998) for example, estimated that a 1% increase in the scale of
9
economic activity raises pollution concentrations by .25 to .5%, but the accompanying increases
in income drives concentrations down by over 1% via a technique effect.
19
or less polluting ways.   In other words, the Kuznets function is itself subject to different paths
9
depending on technological and institutional choices, reflecting the relative value of environmental
amenities attached to them by different societies.  The problem, in other words, is one of induced
innovation in the face of market failure.  We can think of this problem in terms of an
"endogenous" Kuznets function, in which social choices are made to foreshorten the path by
which pollutants are reduced over time (see Figure 3).  The question is whether the social
resources necessary to effect this reduction are available, and, furthermore, whether collective
decisions are made to reduce pollution at a more rapid rate.
This question lies at the heart of the debate over trade and environment.  Obviously, the
political process at both the national and the international level is only beginning to respond -- and
grudgingly, to the negative environmental impacts of economic growth.  Agriculture, for example,
has largely escaped much of this oversight (Ervin, et al., 1998).  Moreover, the data suggests that
such responses are much less likely at lower levels of income, even in well-functioning
democracies.  In the United States and Western Europe, environmental responsibility and even
corporate environmental activism are very much in favor with the public and a large part of the
private sector.  But in most developing countries, environmental regulation is regarded as at best
an affectation of the rich, and at worst an excuse to deny market access to Third World exporters
as a form of "green protection."  The central conundrum facing global environmental policy is
how to connect incentives for upward harmonization of environmental standards to the2021
dynamic process of trade liberalization, while avoiding the use of "environmental conditionality"
as an excuse for closing off market access (see Runge, et. al., 1997; Vogel, 1995). 
Critics of naive interpretations of the Kuznets curve (including this author) have thus
emphasized the role of national and international policy choices in reducing pollution as income
grows.  Lopez (1994), for example, showed that when growth is determined exogenously from
environmental quality, if polluters do not internalize the costs of pollution, environmental
degradation will continue to rise with economic growth.  Ezzati, et al. (1998) demonstrated that a
Kuznets inverted “U” shaped curve can be obtained only in very specific circumstances in which
multiple factors (not just income) interact.  Antweiler, et al. (1998), in the same spirit, note that it
is only when income growth and factor abundance are jointly allowed to determine trade and
pollution patterns that meaningful empirical estimates are possible.
None of this, however, is inconsistent with Ruttan’s Principle; it only broadens and
deepens the delta of work which it has generated.  But it remains striking how differently the role
of global economic growth and its impacts on the environment are perceived.  The Kuznets curve,
even if its mechanisms are ill-understood, suggests an optimistic view of both technological and
institutional adoption to environmental challenges.  Others, however, pessimistically see trade,
and growth, as an engine of destruction (see Runge, 1998a).  Perhaps there are centers of both
types of opinion for a reason.
Entries in The Economist of April 17, 1999 give voice to the optimism and pessimism held
by different groups over the consequences of environmental stress.  In England, Teddy Goldsmith
is recognized as a leading firebrand in global environmental pessimism.  Founder of the Ecologist,
inspiration of the Green Party, and co-editor of The Case Against the Global Economy, he22
personifies the pessimistic European world view of environmental activists who see global trade
as a destroyer (The Economist, 1999a).  In the same issue, however, comes an article pointing out
that the real value of commodities has been falling for over a century, reflecting the broad trends
identified in Ruttan’s essay and giving rise to the technological optimism of those who see nearly
unlimited substitution potential (The Economist, 1999b).
Earlier, I referred to the question of innovation possibilities by reference to the capital-
theoretic idea of a putty-clay model, in which output is composed of malleable production goods
(putty) which are baked into machines (clay) that cannot be turned back into putty.  In putty-clay
models as developed by Salter (1960), Phelps (1963), and Solow (1966), the process of
transformation is costless and occurs instantaneously even if it is irreversible (see Nuti, 1970). 
Yet if it is recognized that both technologies and institutions are given in the short run with
relatively fixed ratios of putty and clay, and that converting one into the other is neither costless
nor instantaneous, a theory begins to emerge in which output is apportioned between them in a
way that circumscribes or truncates the range of technical and institutional choice.  The degrees of
freedom accorded to these choices depend on the social putty/clay ratio.
I conjecture that if we could measure the putty/clay ratio in terms of both the
technological and institutional opportunities open to individuals in different social settings, we
could better characterize how wide in scope is the innovation possibilities frontier.  Even if all
societies are assumed to have an equal proportion of agents that we call (generally ex post facto)
“entrepreneurs,” the capacity of entrepreneurs to solve technical and institutional problems will
depend on the putty they can mold, versus the clay they are given, as well as the costs and time
required to remold putty into new technical and institutional forms.23
Where there is little putty and only fixed methods to deal with, the innovation possibilities
frontier is truncated or narrowed, making innovation less likely, and encouraging a pessimistic
view of technological and institutional progress.  Moreover, where entrepreneurial agents are
mobile, they will move to lands of putty, and abandon traditional lands of clay, reinforcing centers
of optimism and innovation while leaving vintage clay to slowly erode and become obsolete. 
Over time, therefore, these centers of innovation will become technological and institutional
oases, where technological optimism is both widely held and widely reinforced not just by
innovation possibility, but its actuality.  Cities of clay, in contrast, will become centers of
technological and institutional pessimism.  Silicon Valley, in this sense, is a figurative oasis of
putty; much of the economy of Great Britain and Europe may be made of elegant but eroding
clay.2425
Conclusion
My purpose in this paper has been to sketch the history of an idea: that the natural
environment has value, and that choices made in the last four decades have been induced by
increases in its perceived value.  A stream of thought originated in Hick’s insight that firms adopt
techniques according to the relative abundance of factor inputs.  This stream widened to a river of
research when Hayami and Ruttan generalized the argument to the technological and institutional
choices of differentially endowed societies such as the U.S. and Japan.  At the same time, Ruttan
applied this argument to the environment and its value, which together with changes in income
could be expected to induce choices in favor of environmental protection, especially relative to
goods such as food, even where (indeed because) markets failed.
The river has now become a delta, based especially in the widening debate over income
growth and its apparent linkages to environmental improvement — whether trade liberalization
creates the wherewithal to make these improvements or is an engine of environmental destruction. 
Fundamentally, this is a debate over whether growth in market demand, combined with
recognized market failure, lead to induced innovations that offer environmental protection
through new technologies and institutions.  It is of particular relevance as income growth occurs
in the developing world, where optimists believe that environmental protection can occur too. 
Finally, I have observed that how rapidly societies can adapt to change, justifying such optimism,
ultimately depends on their endowments of technical and institutional putty relative to clay.
I conclude with a remark on my metaphorical tracing of stream to river and river to delta. 
Delta (a sign of some importance to economists) is an ancient symbol of both change and fertility,
two concepts that amply capture a lifetime of work and achievement by Vernon Ruttan.26
References
Agweek, 1: 35, May 7, 1986.
Ahmad, S.  “On the Theory of Induced Invention.”  Economic Journal 76 (1966): 344-57.
Anderson, T. L., O. Burt, and D. Fractor.  “Privatizing Groundwater Basins.”  In Water Rights,
T. L. Anderson (ed.), San Francisco: Pacific Institute for Public Policy Research.  1983.
Andrews, R. N. L.  Managing the Environment, Managing Ourselves: A History of American
Environmental Policy.  New Haven: Yale University Press.  1999.
Antle, J. M. and G. Heidebrink.  “Environment and Development:  Theory and International
Evidence.”  Economic Development and Cultural Change 43 (April, 1995): 605-626.
Antweiler, W., B. R. Copeland and M. S. Taylor.  “Is Free Trade Good for the Environment?” 
Department of Economics.  University of Wisconsin.  March 17, 1998.
Binswanger, H. P. and V. W. Ruttan.  Induced Innovation: Technology, Institutions and
Development.  Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press.  1978.
Bromley, D. W.  Economic Interests and Institutions: The Conceptual Foundations of Public
Policy.  New York: Basil Blackwell.  1989.
Buchanan, J. M., and W. C. Stubblebine.  “Externality.”  Economica 29 (1962): 371-84.
Buttel, F. H., and W. L. Flinn.  “The Structure of Support for the Environmental Movement.” 
Rural Sociology 39 (1974):  56-69.
Caldwell, Lynton.  “Environment: A New Focus for Public Policy?”  Public Administration
Review 22 (1963): 132-139.
Copeland, B. R. and M. S. Taylor.  “North-South Trade and the Environment.”  Quarterly
Journal of Economics 109 (1994): 755-87.
Copeland, B. R. and M. S. Taylor.  “Trade and Transboundary Pollution.”  American Economic
Review 85 (1995): 716-737.
Crosson, P. R.  “Agricultural Development.”  In Sustainable Development of the Biosphere, eds.
T. Mann and W. C. Clark.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  1986.
Dahlman, C. J.  “The Problem of Externality.”  Journal of Law and Economics 22:1 (1979): 141-
62.27
David, P. A.  “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY.”  American Economic Review (May 1985): 
332-337.
Dean, J. M.  “Testing the Impact of Trade Liberalization on the Environment: Theory and
Evidence,” mimeo, John Hopkins University, 1998.
Dunlap. R. E.  “The Impact of Political Orientation on Environmental Attitudes and Actions.” 
Environment and Behavior 7 (1975): 428-54.
Economist, The.  “The other Goldsmith: How Teddy Goldsmith has played godfather to the
environmental movement.”  April 17-23, 1999a, pp. 61-62.
Economist, The.  “A Raw Deal for Commodities.”  April 17-23, 1999b, 75-76.
English, B. C., J. A. Maetzhold, B. R. Holding, and E. O. Heady.  Future Agricultural
Technology and Resource Conservation.  Ames: Iowa State University Press.  1984.
Ervin, David E. C. Ford Runge, Elisabeth A. Graffy, Willis E. Anthony, Sandra S. Batie, Paul
Faeth, Tim Penny, and Tim Warman  "Agriculture and the Environment:  A New Strategic
Vision."  Environment 40:6 (July/August 1998): 8-15, 35-40.
Ezzati, M., B. H. Singer, and D. M. Kammen.  “Towards a Predictive Theory of Development:
The Dynamics of Environmental Kuznets Curves.”  Princeton University.  Woodrow Wilson
School of Public and International Affairs.  1998.
Fellner, W.  “Two Propositions in the Theory of Induced Innovation.”  Economic Journal 71
(1961): 305-8.
Fellner, W.  “Does the Market Direct the Relative Factor-Savings Effects of Technological
Progress?”  In The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, ed. R. R. Nelson.  National
Bureau of Economic Research.  Princeton: Princeton University Press.  1962.
Frederick, K.  “Irrigation and the Future of American Agriculture.”  In S. Batie and R. Healy
(eds.), The Future of American Agriculture as a Strategic Resource, Washington, DC: The
Conservation Foundation.  1980.
Freeman, A. M., III.  The Benefits of Environmental Improvement.  Resources for the Future. 
Baltimore:  The Johns Hopkins University Press.  1979.
Goldsmith, Teddy.   The Case Against the Global Economy: And for a Turn Toward the Local. 
Jerry Mander and Edward Goldsmith (eds.), San Francisco, CA: Sierra Club Books, 1996.
 
)TQUUOCP￿ )GPG /￿ CPF #NCP $￿ -TWGIGT￿ ’PXKTQPOGPVCN +ORCEVU QH C 0QTVJ #OGTKECP (TGG
6TCFG #ITGGOGPV￿ &KUEWUUKQP 2CRGT ￿￿￿￿￿ 2TKPEGVQP￿ 0GY ,GTUG[￿ 2TKPEGVQP 7PKXGTUKV[￿28
9QQFTQY 9KNUQP 5EJQQN QH 2WDNKE CPF +PVGTPCVKQPCN #HHCKTU￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
)TQUUOCP￿ )GPG /￿￿ CPF #NCP $￿ -TWGIGT￿ ￿’EQPQOKE )TQYVJ CPF VJG ’PXKTQPOGPV￿￿
3WCTVGTN[ ,QWTPCN QH ’EQPQOKEU ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿/C[￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
Graham-Tomasi, T., C. F. Runge, and W. F. Hyde.  “Foresight and Expectations in Models of
Natural Resource Markets.”  Land Economics 62:3 (August, 1986): 234-49.
Griffin, R., and D. Bromley.  “Irrigation and the Nitrate Contamination Problem.”  Economic
Issues 56.  Department of Agricultural Economics.  University of Wisconsin-Madison.  1981.
Harrison, D., Jr., and D. L. Rubenfeld.  “Hedonic Housing Prices and the Demand for Clean Air.” 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 5:2 (1978): 81-102.
*CWGT￿ )TCPV CPF %￿ (QTF 4WPIG￿ ￿6TCFG￿’PXKTQPOGPV .KPMCIGU KP VJG 4GUQNWVKQP QH
6TCPUDQWPFCT[ ’ZVGTPCNKVKGU￿￿ 6JG 9QTNF ’EQPQO[ ￿￿￿￿ ￿,CPWCT[ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
*CWGT￿ )￿ -￿ +PVGTPCVKQPCN 2QNNWVKQP ’ZVGTPCNKVKGU￿ 2WDNKE $CFU YKVJ /WNVKRNG ,WTKUFKEVKQPU￿
2J￿&￿ 6JGUKU￿ 7PKXGTUKV[ QH /KPPGUQVC￿ #WIWUV￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
Hayami, Y. and V.W. Ruttan.   Economic Development: An International Perspective. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.  1971.
Hayami, Y. and V. W. Ruttan.  Agricultural Development: An International Perspective. 
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.  Revised edition.  1985.
Hicks, J. R.  The Theory of Wages.  London: MacMillan and Co.  1932.
Hirsch, F.  Social Limits to Growth.  Cambridge: Harvard University Press.  1976.
Kennedy, C.  “Induced Bias in Innovation and the Theory of Distribution.”  Economic Journal 74
(1964):  541-47.
Kneese, A.  “Water Resource Constraints: The Case of the Ogallala Aquifer.”  In The Future of 
The North American Granary: Politics, Economics and Resource Constraints in North
American Agriculture, ed. C. F. Runge.  Ames: Iowa State University Press.  1986.
Koppel, B. M.  “Induced Innovation Theory, Agricultural Research, and Asia’s Green Revolution:
A Reappraisal.”  In B. M. Koppel (ed.) Induced Innovation Theory and International
Agricultural Development: A Reassessment.  Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.  1995.
Kuznets, S.  “Economic Growth and Income Inequality.”  American Economic Review 45 (1955):
1-28.29
Krutilla, J. V., and A. Fisher.  The Economics of Natural Environments.  Resources for the
Future.  Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.  1975.
Lancaster, K. J.  “A New Approach to Consumer Theory.”  Journal of Political Economy (April,
1966): 132-57.
Lopez, R.  “The Environment as a Factor of Production: The Effects of Economic Growth and
Trade Liberalization.”  Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 27 (1994):
163-184.
Mackenzie, S. A.  “Irrigation, Energy Demand and Public Policy: An Analysis and Case Study of
the Central Sands Region of Wisconsin.”  M.S. Thesis.  Land Resources.  University of
Wisconsin-Madison.  1983.
Maler, K. G.  Environmental Economics: A Theoretical Inquiry.  Resources for the Future. 
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.  1974.
McEvoy, J., III.  “The American Concern for the Environment.”  In W. Burch, et al. (eds.), Social
Behavior, Natural Resources, and the Environment.  New York: Harper and Row.  1972.
Myers, R. J.  “Economic Inefficiency under Uncertainty and the Effects of Ideal Risk Markets in
U.S. Agriculture.”  Ph.D. Thesis.  Agricultural and Applied Economics.  University of
Minnesota.  1986.
Nunn, S. C.  “The Political Economy of Institutional Change: A Distribution Criterion for
Acceptance of Groundwater Rules.”  Natural Resources Journal 25 (1985) 867-92.
Nuti, D. M.  “Capitalism, Socialism and Steady Growth.”  Economic Journal 80 (1970): 32-54.
Phelps, E. S.  “Substitutions, Fixed Proportions, Growth and Distribution.”  International
Economic Review 4 (1963): 265-288.
Runge, C. F.  “Institutions and the Free Rider: The Assurance Problem in Collective Action.” 
Journal of Politics 46 (1984a): 154-81.
Runge, C. F.  “Strategic Interdependence in Models of Property Rights.”  American Journal of
Agricultural Economics 66 (1984b): 807-13.
Runge, C. F., and R. J. Myers.  “Shifting Foundations of Agricultural Policy Analysis: Welfare
Economics When Risk Markets are Incomplete.”  American Journal of Agricultural
Economics 67 (1985): 1010-16.30
Runge, C. F., and H. von Witzke.  “Institutional Change in the Common Agricultural Policy of
the European Community.”  American Journal of Agricultural Economics 69 (May, 1987):
213-222.
Runge, C. Ford.  “Induced Agricultural Innovation and Environmental Quality: The Case of
Groundwater Regulation.”  Land Economics 63:3 (August 1987): 249-258.
4WPIG￿ %￿ (QTF￿ ￿6TCFG￿ 2QNNWVKQP￿ CPF ’PXKTQPOGPVCN 2TQVGEVKQP￿￿ %JCRVGT ￿￿ KP 6JG
*CPFDQQM QH ’PXKTQPOGPVCN ’EQPQOKEU￿ &CPKGN 9￿ $TQONG[ ￿GF￿￿￿ 1ZHQTF￿ 7PKVGF
-KPIFQO￿ $NCEMYGNN￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ RR￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
4WPIG￿ %￿ (QTF￿ ’WIGPKQ %CR￿ 2CWN (CGVJ￿ 2CVTKEKC /E)KPPKU￿ &GOGVTK 2CRCIGQTIKQW￿ ,COGU
6QDG[￿ CPF 4QDGTV *QWUOCP￿ 5WUVCKPCDNG 6TCFG ’ZRCPUKQP KP .CVKP #OGTKEC CPF VJG
%CTKDDGCP￿ #PCN[UKU CPF #UUGUUOGPV￿ 9CUJKPIVQP￿ &%￿ 9QTNF 4GUQWTEGU +PUVKVWVG￿
#WIWUV ￿￿￿￿￿
Runge, C. Ford.  “Global Trade and Sustainability: Machines in the Earth’s Garden.”  Choices,
Fourth Quarter, 1998a, pp. 11-14.
Runge, C. Ford.  “Emerging Issues in Agricultural Trade and the Environment,” OECD
Workshop on Emerging Trade Issues in Agriculture.  COM/AGR/CA/TD/TC/WS(98)103.  A
paper prepared for the Directorate for Food, Agriculture and Fisheries , Trade Directorate,
OECD Workshop on Emerging Trade Issues in Agriculture, Paris October 26-27, 1998b.
Ruttan, Vernon W.  “Presidential Address: Technology and the Environment.”  American Journal
of Agricultural Economics, 53:5 (December 1971): 707-717.
Ruttan, Vernon W.  “Constraints on the Design of Sustainable Systems of Agricultural
Production.”  Ecological Economics 10 (1994): 209-219.
Ruttan, Vernon W.  “Research to Meet Crop Production Needs: Into the 21  Century.”  Chapter
st
1 in International Crop Science I.  Crop Science Society of America:  Madison, WI.  1993.
Ruttan, V. W. and Y. Hayami.  “Induced Innovation Theory: A Reassessment.”    In B. M.
Koppel (ed.) Induced Innovation Theory and International Agricultural Development: A
Reassessment.  Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.  1995.
Saliba, B. C.  “Irrigated Agriculture and Groundwater Quality: A Framework for Policy
Development.”  American Journal of Agricultural Economics 67 (1985): 1231-37.
Salter, W. E. G.  Productivity and Technical Change.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
1960.31
Samuelson, P. A.  “A Theory of Induced Innovation Along Kennedy-Weisacker Lines.”  Review
of Economics and Statistics 47 (1965): 343-56.
5GNFGP￿ 6JQOCU /￿ CPF &CSKPI 5QPI￿ ￿’PXKTQPOGPVCN 3WCNKV[ CPF &GXGNQROGPV￿ +U 6JGTG C
-W\PGVU %WTXG HQT #KT 2QNNWVKQP ’OKUUKQPU!￿ ,QWTPCN QH ’PXKTQPOGPVCN ’EQPQOKEU CPF
/CPCIGOGPV ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
Sen, Amartya Kumar.  Choice of Techniques.  Oxford: Blackwell.  1960.
Sloggett, G.  Energy and U.S. Agriculture: Irrigation Pumping, 1979.  Washington, DC: U.S.
Department of Agriculture, ESCS Report 436 (September 1979).
Smith, V. K.  “Relative Prices, Technical Change and Environmental Preservation.”  Natural
Resources Journal 15 (1975): 283-95.
Solow, R. M.  “Substitution and Fixed Proportions in the Theory of Capital.”  Review of
Economic Studies 29 (1966):  207-218.
Stanford, James O.  “C.G.E. Models of North American Free Trade: A Critique of Methods and
Assumptions.”  Testimony to the United States International Trade Commission, Public
Hearing on Economy-Wide Modeling of the Economic Implications of Free Trade,
Investigation No. 332-317.    Economics Department: Graduate Faculty, New School for
Social Research, New York.  April, 1992.
Stewart, Frances.  Technology and Underdevelopment.  Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977.
Van Liere, K. D., and R. E. Dunlap.  “The Social Bases of Environmental Concern: A Review of
Hypotheses, Explanations and Empirical Evidence.”  Public Opinion Quarterly (1980): 191-
97.
8QIGN￿ &￿ 6TCFKPI 7R￿ %QPUWOGT CPF ’PXKTQPOGPVCN 4GIWNCVKQP KP C )NQDCN ’EQPQO[￿
%CODTKFIG￿ /#￿ *CTXCTF 7PKXGTUKV[ 2TGUU￿ ￿￿￿￿￿